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A DEFENSE OF A WITTGENSTEINIAN OUTLOOK ON
TWO POSTMODERN THEORIES
Sarah Halvorson-Fried
Abstract The way postmodern thinkers deal with issues of
language and power has been highly influenced by Ludwig
Wittgenstein‘s later philosophy of language. Wittgenstein‘s
conception of language as a collection of ―language-games‖ based
on agreement in use rather than a direct reflection of objective
reality is central to these issues. In this paper, I will show how this
Wittgensteinian conception manifests itself in two important
contemporary theories: the liberal ironism of Richard Rorty and
the feminist philosophy of Luce Irigaray. I will show how Rorty‘s
and Irigaray‘s Wittgenstein-influenced theories both bring
Wittgenstein‘s philosophy of language into a more social context,
and argue ultimately that through such theories we can better
understand social issues in our modern world.
Much of postmodern theory deals with issues of language
and power. According to many postmodern thinkers, most of the
relationships between language and power go unnoticed, as the
public usually sees language as a neutral medium within which we
can communicate. But language has the power to oppress, the
power to assign identities, the power to liberate. The way
postmodern thinkers deal with these issues has been highly
influenced by Ludwig Wittgenstein‘s later philosophy of language.
In this paper, I will show how this influence manifests itself in two
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important theories: the liberal ironism of Richard Rorty, a
―distinctive and controversial [pragmatist]‖1 and the feminist
philosophy of Luce Irigaray, a prominent name in the French
school of feminism. I will respond to criticisms of Rorty that call
his theory misrepresentative, and identify the disparity between
Rorty‘s and Wittgenstein‘s goals as a vital reason to accept Rorty‘s
invocation of Wittgenstein. I will identify Wittgensteinian concepts
in Irigaray‘s feminism and establish a similar disparity in goals. I
will then use a Wittgensteinian reading of Irigaray to illustrate the
purpose and value of analyzing postmodern theory under a
Wittgensteinian lens. Ultimately, I believe that it is through such a
lens that we can better understand many postmodern approaches to
the relationship between humans, language and the world. In
particular, I will show in this paper that his conception of language
as based on agreement in use is central to both Irigaray‘s feminism
and Rorty‘s liberal ironism.
I. Rorty’s Use of Wittgenstein
Rorty refers to Wittgenstein‘s later work in order to argue
against the prevailing acceptance of universality and representation
of truth in political and philosophical systems. In Contingency,
Irony, and Solidarity, he criticizes the basing of political systems
on sweeping political theories and ideologies and proposes a new
―politics of redescription.‖ In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,
he criticizes the epistemological tradition of Western philosophy,
disparaging its perception of the ability to discover truth, and

1

Bjorn Ramberg, ―Richard Rorty,‖ (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rorty/.
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proposes a turn in philosophy toward a more conversational, less
argumentative and truth-value-based approach. In both works,
Rorty uses Wittgensteinian philosophy as a defense for his
rejection of universalizing systems.
In Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty spells out
implications of Wittgensteinian philosophy of language,
identifying Wittgenstein as one important thinker who revealed the
human-created, shifting nature of ―vocabularies.‖ Rorty‘s
―vocabularies‖ can be thought of as analogous to Wittgensteinian
―language-games‖ and refer to specific cultural collections of ways
of thinking, communicating, and acting (ways of living). Rorty
argues that if vocabularies are indeed created contingently and in
constant shift, if they are ―optional and mutable,‖2 then the values
they express, too, are optional and mutable. He asserts that neither
the vocabularies nor their values should be imposed on anyone,
and that political systems should seek to include multiple
vocabularies. Such systems he terms ―liberal utopias,‖ inhabited by
―liberal ironists‖ who would recognize their own contingency,
acknowledging the possibility of shifting truth and shifting
morality, which continue to change as they are influenced by
different (contingent) factors. Seeking to provide people with the
most freedom of expression possible and alleviate the most
suffering possible (this is the ―liberal‖ part), they would promote
their causes through redescriptions rather than arguments.3
Like Nietzsche, Freud, and Donald Davidson, Wittgenstein
is a stepping-stone on the path to Rorty‘s land of liberal utopias,
2

Ibid.
Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989), 9.
3

80

where we all recognize contingency. According to Rorty,
Wittgenstein helped us along this path by revealing the
contingency of language: In positing that language forms an
objective framework based on agreement rather than adhering or
corresponding to an (already-existing) objective framework,
Wittgenstein makes us see language as a product of historical
contingencies. Here it is useful to explore Rorty‘s use of Donald
Davidson‘s philosophy of language, another stepping-stone.
Davidson, like Wittgenstein, asserted that what makes language
work is understanding between speakers, not expression of truth.
Davidson‘s notion of ―passing theories‖ from his 1986 paper ―A
Nice Derangment of Epitaphs‖ states that understanding between
two linguistic beings occurs when their concepts of a word‘s
meaning converge. Each person‘s concept of each word‘s meaning
is in constant shift relative to context, so understanding – and
meaning – are also in constant shift. This assertion helps us
recognize the contingency of language by revealing its lack of
necessity, like Darwin‘s theory of evolution revealed the
contingency of the biology of species.
Davidson lets us think of the history of
language, and thus of culture, as Darwin taught
us to think of the history of a coral reef. . . . Our
language and our culture are as much a
contingency, as much as a result of thousands of
small mutations finding niches (and millions of
others finding no niches), as are the orchids and
the anthropoids.4

4

Ibid., 16.
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Just as the present state of species has depended on many
contingent factors, so has our language. Rather than an expression
of or correspondence to reality, it is somewhat a product of chance:
Things could easily be otherwise. In addition, they are bound to
continue to change. For this reason, according to Rorty, no singular
ideology can be the right one: The circumstances under which
ideologies and social theories come into being will never be static.
As situations change, so should the vocabularies we use and the
values on which our political systems are based.
Rorty does for philosophy in Philosophy and the Mirror of
Nature what he does for politics in Contingency, Irony, and
Solidarity, presenting this idea of redescription rather than appeal
to universal truth within the discipline of philosophy. In this book,
Rorty criticizes the epistemological tradition and details what he
sees as a necessary shift in Western philosophy. He uses the
arguments of several philosophers, including Wittgenstein, to
critique the representational view of knowledge central to
traditional epistemology. According to Rorty, Wittgenstein, along
with Sellars, Quine, Kuhn, and Davidson, showed that neither the
mind nor language is capable of mirroring reality. Subsequently,
the discipline of philosophy had to change, because epistemology
ceased to make sense.5 As such, the traditional questions of
philosophy are no longer relevant to our time. They are not, as
many believe, timeless. The last sentence of his book reads,
The only point on which I would insist is that
the philosophers‘ moral concern should be with
5

Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1979, 169.
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continuing the conversation of the West, rather
than with insisting upon a place for the
traditional problems of modern philosophy
within that conversation.6
We should not ―insist on a place‖ for these traditional problems
precisely because they will not, as so many philosophers have
believed, lead us to discovery of universal truths. When we do
philosophy, according to Rorty, we should neither assume that we
operate outside the boundaries of contingency nor that we have a
privileged ability to discover ―truth.‖ Rather than some sort of
elevated search for truth, he claims that our Western tradition of
philosophy is just another vocabulary (or language-game).
Instead, as in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty
would have us enter a more conversational approach. Once more,
Wittgenstein‘s influence is clear. Under Rorty‘s ―naturally holistic
conversational justification,‖ which he favors over the ―reductive
and atomistic‖ justification of the epistemological tradition, social
justification of belief creates knowledge. Just as language finds
objectivity of meaning in social agreement under Wittgenstein, so
does knowledge find objectivity of truth in social agreement under
Rorty. Under this view, philosophy as a search for truth is
nonsensical: We ―have no need to view [knowledge] as accuracy of
representation‖ since ―we understand knowledge when we
understand the social justification of belief.‖7 Rorty terms this view
―epistemological behaviorism‖ and once again attributes his theory
to Witgensteinian influence.

6
7

Ibid., 394.
Ibid., 170.
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Explaining rationality and epistemic authority
by reference to what society lets us say, rather
than the latter by the former, is the essence of
what I shall call ‗epistemological behaviorism,‘
an attitude common to Dewey and
Wittgenstein.8
And for Rorty, if we recognize philosophy‘s inability to discover
truth in any objective sense, then we should change the discipline.
Just as in Contingency, Irony, and Soliarity, Rorty would have us
reject a privileged, contingently created position of philosophy in
favor of a conversational discipline inclusive of multiple languagegames.
A legitimate worry for many critics is that Rorty
simultaneously makes normative claims while rejecting
normativity. This may indeed be a problem for Rorty, but for the
purposes of this paper it is not relevant. My task here is to show
the validity of Rorty‘s invocation of Wittgenstein. Another worry is
that in expounding on the created nature of meaning, Rorty is
rejecting objectivity of meaning in any form; in ordinary words,
for instance, like ―apple‖ or ―table.‖ Such a rejection would make
Rorty an anti-realist. I do not think he aims to do this: Rorty‘s
concern is primarily with the abandonment of essential identities in
order to allow for shifting notions of selves, cultures, and truths.
He makes this distinction himself in Contingency, Irony, and
Solidarity.
We need to make a distinction between the
8
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claim that the world is out there and the claim
that the truth is out there. To say that the world
is out there, that it is not our creation, is to say,
with common sense, that most things in space
and time are the effects of causes which do not
include human mental states. To say that the
truth is not out there is simply to say that where
there are no sentences there is no truth, that
sentences are elements of human languages, and
that human languages are human creations.9
Rorty is decidedly not an anti-realist, though he does have a
pluralist notion of truth: Since truth is not ―out there,‖ since it is
created by humans, it can be created in many ways. The last worry
I will explore in the next section: that in fact Rorty may not be able
to use philosophers like Wittgenstein as he does; that he may be
misrepresenting them and that his use of Wittgenstein may be
unfounded.
II. Is Rorty’s Use of Wittgenstein Valid?
Rorty makes bold claims when he uses philosophers like
Wittgenstein to support his politics and philosophy of
redescription. Is this use valid? We might ask, as some have: How
can Rorty make the jump from Wittgenstein‘s notion of language
as use to ―contingency of language‖ in Contingency, Irony, and
Solidarity? Does Wittgenstein really exhibit language‘s
contingency? Does Rorty accurately represent Wittgenstein in
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, when he cites Wittgenstein
as one of the philosophers who changed the nature of
9

Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 5.
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epistemology? Does he interpret Wittgenstein‘s notions of
language-games and of language as agreement correctly? I argue
first that he does in fact represent Wittgensteinian concepts of
language accurately, and second that these questions are somewhat
inappropriate, because Rorty and Wittgenstein have very different
goals. Wittgenstein is trying to determine the nature of
communication. His task is quite an apolitical one: He simply
wishes to discover the true nature of language, and he discovers it
to be a practice based on custom. Rorty has a larger goal in mind:
He wishes both to convince us that all of our practices based on
custom are not necessarily right, that we cannot justify anything
with an appeal to ―truth‖ since everything we do and think is not
necessary but contingent, and to propose new systems – of society
and of philosophy – based on this recognition. It is because of this
disparity of purpose that Rorty‘s use of Wittgenstein is not, as
some critics have proposed, invalid. Rather, Wittgenstein‘s
philosophy of language, like Darwin‘s theory of evolution, is
useful to Rorty for purposes of illustration: Wittgenstein serves
both as a useful comparison and as an important predecessor. In
appealing to Wittgenstein, Rorty is simply laying out for the reader
Wittgenstein‘s influence on his own theory.
Wolf Rehder is one of these critics. In ―Hermeneutics
versus Stupidities of All Sorts: A Review-Discussion of R. Rorty‘s
‗Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,‘‖ Rehder disparages Rorty
for his use of philosophers like Wittgenstein.
As witnesses for his holistic, antifoundationalist,
and pragmatist new view of philosophy as
hermeneutics, Rorty calls, among others,
86

Foucault,
Dewey,
Wittgenstein,
Sartre,
Kierkegaard, Quine, Gadamer, Feyerabend and
Heidegger, a truly motley group of big names.
However, he makes only makes a meager case
against epistemology and traditional philosophy
with this impressive phalanx of witnesses for
the prosecution. It is not going too far to say that
his backing up his case with this echelon of
genuinely great men does not only not do justice
to their philosophical work, but even tends to
demean their work and their role in the history
of philosophy. This is so, because Rorty‘s
‗positive‘ case, his hermeneutic turn and
proposed transcending of truth-oriented inquiry
is, unfortunately, surprisingly naïve.10
It is naïve, according to Rehder, because there cannot be useful
conversation without conflict, nor can it exist without a common
language or discourse. In Rehder‘s view, Rorty is proposing the
opposite: agreement between different languages and discourses.
―Any fruitful discussion is based on some sort of disagreement.‖11
This is a commonly held view: To engage in conversation, we must
share a language-game; and to debate, we must disagree. It seems
to me, though, that in criticizing Rorty on this point Rehder is
simply not taking Rorty seriously: Rorty‘s point is that useful
conversation is possible – better, even – if it considers perspectives
of multiple vocabularies. To say that useful conversation must
happen within the same vocabulary is to refuse Rorty‘s proposed
10

Wulf Rehder, ―Hermeneutics versus Stupidities of All Sorts: A ReviewDiscussion of R. Rorty‘s ‗Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,‖ Zeitschrift für
allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie / Journal for General Philosophy of Science
14, no. 1 (1983): 95, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25170640.
11
Ibid., 96.
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shift, to disregard his entire point of making the discourse of
philosophy more inclusive of multiple language-games. Rorty‘s
usage of all of these philosophers to defend his ―naïve‖ system
obviously troubles Rehder. After all, he says, ―[It] does not only
not do justice to their philosophical work, but even tends to
demean their work and their role in the history of philosophy.‖ It is
this criticism that I will now address.
First, Rorty does seem to accurately represent Wittgenstein.
Wittgenstein created a new framework for objectivity based on
social agreement rather than on truth. This agreement in no way
determines truth or falsity, but instead forms a new standard of
objectivity. In response to the invisible interlocutor in section 241,
―So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and
what is false?‖ Wittgenstein offers an alternative: ―It is what
humans say that is true or false; and they agree in the language
they use.‖12 Agreement does not determine truth in the world, only
truth in our agreed-upon shared account of the world – in our
shared language. It is this agreement that allows us to
communicate with one another. People are understandable when
their definitions accord with socially accepted ones. When Rorty
says that Wittgenstein ―[explains] rationality and epistemic
authority by reference to what society lets us say, rather than the
latter by the former,‖13 he seems to be correct: Wittgenstein‘s
account of a socially formed objective framework does conform to
Rorty‘s ―epistemological behaviorism,‖ as it locates objectivity in
social accordance.
12

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1953), 88.
13
Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 174.
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Second, it is useful to ask why Rorty appeals to ―this
impressive phalanx of witnesses.‖ Does he aim to represent them?
Given the difference in Rorty‘s and Wittgenstein‘s goals, strict
adherence is not necessarily essential. Any apparent disparity
between Rorty‘s Wittgenstein‘s systems is unimportant, because
Rorty and Wittgenstein are not making the same kind of claim.
They are not talking about the same kind of thing. When Rorty
says, ―the truth is not out there,‖14 he does not mean that we create
the objective world. Indeed, he explicitly distinguishes between
―the claim that the truth is not out there and the claim that the
world is not out there.‖15 He means that our social and cultural
institutions, our beliefs, our methods of inquiry (like philosophy)
are created in the same way that language is, in the same way that
evolution is. Rorty does not really claim to adhere to Wittgenstein,
so he cannot be criticized for it. In both Philosophy and the Mirror
of Nature and Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty invokes
Wittgenstein as an important influence, but not as his only
influence. Where Wittgenstein‘s goal is to discover and describe,
Rorty‘s is to reveal, convince, and change.
III. Illumination Through Irigaray
Irigaray is Wittgensteinian in many of the same ways as
Rorty: She holds a pluralist view of truth, rejects normativity, and
uses Wittgenstein‘s notions of language-games and forms of life.
But because she does not invoke Wittgenstein‘s name to defend her
views, as Rorty does, she is never criticized for misrepresentation,

14
15

Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 5.
Ibid., 5.
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as Rorty is. This fact reveals Rorty‘s immunity to such criticism.
Her theory also illustrates the effectiveness of applying later
Wittgensteinian philosophy to postmodern theories. Through an
exploration of her work, I hope to show this usefulness.
In To Speak Is Never Neutral, Irigaray questions the
assumed impartiality of language and calls on us to recognize both
its sexed nature as ―the language of man‖ (a title of one of her
chapters) and its unfairly universalizing tendencies. She states in
her introduction, ―This book is a questioning of the language of
science, and an investigation into the sexualization of language,
and the relation between the two.‖16 In ―Linguistic Sexes and
Genders,‖ she identifies the sexism inherent in language,
examining particular words in her native French. In ―This Sex
Which Is Not One,‖ she states that ―female sexuality has always
been theorized within masculine parameters‖17 and attempts to
conceptualize it differently, outside these parameters. One of
Irigaray‘s main concerns throughout her various works is to show
how the current linguistic system is oppressive to women while
claiming to be universally neutral, an idea clearly influenced by
Wittgenstein, as I will show. Another concern is to show how
change is possible through new feminist language-games, the
details of which can be confusing and have been debated, but
which is clarified through a Wittgensteinian reading of her theory.
Irigaray uses the Wittgensteinian notion of language-games

16

Luce Irigaray, To Speak Is Never Neutral, trans. Gail Schwab (New York:
Routledge, 2002), 5.
17
Luce Irigaray, ―This Sex Which Is Not One,‖ trans. Claudia Reeder, in New
French Feminisms, ed. Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron (New York:
Schoken Books, 1981), 99.
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as well as his conception of objectivity as agreement to describe
the problem of a universal language that is catered toward men but
purported to apply to women as well. According to Irigaray, the
language we accept as universal – the language of politics, of
science, of philosophy – is actually an oppressive, particular
language-game.
A sexed subject imposes his imperatives as
universally valid, and as the only ones capable
of defining the forms of reason, of thought, of
meaning, and of exchange. He still, and always,
comes back to the same logic, the only logic: of
the One, of the Same. Of the Same of the One.18
Just as, in Wittgenstein, we cannot form a private language because
all words we use are defined by the linguistic community, so, in
Irigaray, is it nearly impossible to escape from the purportedly
universal dominating male language-game. In the same vein as
Rorty, Irigaray questions the value of rationality and criticizes the
language of traditional philosophy, which is decidedly male and
which is imposed on women while masking itself as universal to
all.
From [Irigaray‘s] point of view, the
philosophers, of whatever persuasion, are
comfortably installed in the male imaginary, so
comfortably that they are completely unaware of
the sexuate character of ‗universal‘ thought.19
18

Irigaray, To Speak Is Never Neutral, 228.
Margaret Whitford, Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine (New York:
Routledge, 1991), 103.
19
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How, then, is feminist theory even possible? The problem is as
follows: ―Not using logic risks maintaining the other‘s status as
infans . . . Using logic means abolishing difference and
resubmitting to the same imperatives.‖20 If we operate outside the
dominating language-game, we will not be taken seriously, and if
we operate within it, we are giving in, trying to fit ourselves into
the oppressive system.
Irigaray‘s solution, possible under Wittgensteinian
influence, is to form a new language-game that challenges this
discourse. Irigaray appeals to the female body in the formation of a
new language of feminism, under two assumptions: First, that the
male body is already intrinsic to philosophy – in ethics, for
instance, where the point is to enhance positive effects on the body
(e.g., health) and circumvent negative effects (e.g., death). Second,
that the female body is currently defined by male desire and male
language.21 The body is important both in the symbolic and in its
realized form for Irigaray. Rather than being forced to conform
either to the supposedly universal language of men, based on the
male body, or to form a new language based on the male-created
female body, ―the female body has to be allowed its own imaginary
existence in the form of symbolic difference.‖22 This imaginary
existence can only be realized by privileging female life, female
sexuality, and the real female body, as they are ―for themselves.‖23
Irigaray‘s solution is Wittgensteinian because it relies on
Wittgenstein‘s notions of language-games as flexible, changing
20

Irigaray, To Speak Is Never Neutral, 228.
Whitford, Luce Irigaray, 150.
22
Ibid., 103.
23
Irigaray, ―This Sex Which Is Not One,‖ 106.
21
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and organic and of language as a form of life. Formation of a new
language-game is possible because language-games are always
coming into and out of being. The female body itself is an
important part of the female form of life, and so can be appealed to
in Irigaray‘s formation of a new feminine language-game.
Importantly, Irigaray does not declare herself
Wittgensteinian; but a Wittgensteinian reading of Irigaray both
makes sense, as I have shown, and clarifies some aspects of her
solution. Joyce Davidson and Mick Smith show how such a
Wittgensteinian reading clarifies and does justice to Irigaray in
―Wittgenstein and Irigaray: Philosophy and Gender in a Language
(Game) of Difference.‖ Specifically, a Wittgensteinian reading
solves an interpretative conflict among Irigaray scholars. Critics
have typically either called Irigaray essentialist, which she
explicitly claims not to be (her disparagement of universalizing
language is clearly anti-essentialist) or as speaking in metaphor or
symbolism when she speaks about the body (since they know she
is anti-essentialist, they cannot imagine she would invoke the real
body). Even Margaret Whitford, a prominent Irigaray scholar,
acknowledges the difficulty of reading Irigaray, in that ―we are not
quite sure what status is given to Irigaray‘s statements.‖24 She
wonders whether they are ―empirical descriptions . . . ideal
descriptions . . . descriptions of the reigning imaginary . . . or
perhaps simply metaphors again.‖25 Reading Irigaray under a
Wittgensteinian lens, say Davidson and Smith, ―might provide a

24
25

Whitford, Luce Irigaray, 102.
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third alternative‖26 and solve this conflict: Through Wittgenstein,
we can come to terms with Irigaray‘s simultaneous rejection of
essentialism and appeal to the body in formation of a new,
subversive, feminine language-game. Wittgenstein‘s notion of
―blurred concepts‖ or ―family resemblances‖ lets us recognize the
possibility of using something like the female body to create a new
language-game without essentializing it.
Women‘s anatomy might be understood as a real
component of the patterns, context, and
environment that might give rise to a feminine
language-game. So, while anatomy is not an
essential referent to which language must be
fixed, it is a valid and pertinent feature of a
feminine form of life.27
Wittgenstein told us that definitions need not always be fixed, that
a ―the indistinct [picture] is often exactly what we need.‖28 In the
same way, female anatomy need not be essentialized to serve as a
reference point for the creation of a feminine language-game. We
see, then, that Wittgensteinian philosophy does not only manifest
itself in Irigaray‘s theory; it can also help clarify it.
IV. A Difference of Goals: Language and Power
Like Rorty, Irigaray has a political goal, one that is vastly
different from Wittgenstein‘s descriptive one. Rorty and Irigaray
26

Joyce Davidson and Mick Smith, ―Wittgenstein and Irigaray: Gender and
Philosophy in a Language (Game) of Difference,‖ Hypatia 14, no. 2 (1999): 83,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3810769.
27
Ibid., 84.
28
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 34.
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both assume that language has power: In both of their theories, it is
language that oppresses and language that has the power to
liberate. This relationship between language and power was termed
―discourse‖ by Michel Foucault, and refers to language and other
shared aspects of culture as a mechanism that perpetuates itself
through use, never calling itself into question. Central to this idea
is the Wittgensteinian one that language is based on agreement in
use, that social agreement in use forms the objective frameworks
within which we communicate. Wittgenstein was the philosopher
to assert that there was no ideal language capable of representing
reality. Maxine Greene says in ―Postmodernism and the Crisis of
Representation‖ that our postmodern task ―may be a matter of
recognizing that there is no single-dimensional medium reflective
of the ‗facts‘ of the world, but a multiplicity of language games, as
Ludwig Wittgenstein made so clear.‖29 Postmodern thinkers like
Foucault, Rorty, and Irigaray, as well as Judith Butler, Monique
Wittig, and Edward Said, among others, have accepted this task,
drawing out the social and political implications of Wittgensteinian
philosophy of language.
Wittgenstein thus proves to be invaluable to postmodern
theories of language and power: Though Wittgenstein never
approaches the social and political ideas that theorists like Rorty
and Irigaray do, his work is ultimately their basis. For this reason,
and as we have seen through these two case studies, a
Wittgensteinian reading of postmodern theories helps us
understand them.

29

Maxine Greene, ―Postmodernism and the Crisis of Representation,‖ English
Education 26, no. 4 (1994), 208.
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V. Eliminating False Clarity: The Value of WittgensteinInfluenced Postmodern Theory
Both Rorty and Irigaray use Wittgensteinian notions of
language and social agreement to call into question the universality
we so often use to solve political, philosophical, and scientific
problems. Irigaray questions the universality of political,
philosophical, and scientific language, while Rorty questions the
ability of universalizing, truth-seeking systems of politics and
philosophy to provide us with acceptable solutions. I once heard in
an ecology class that ―our best chance of solving problems is to
recognize the complexity of the situation rather than appeal to an
ideology.‖ The professor said such an appeal gives us ―false
clarity.‖ It seems to me that this is true, that more realistic views do
not think themselves universal, and that Rorty‘s and Irigaray‘s
Wittgenstein-influenced theories that seek to reveal the complexity
of the situation in lieu of the false clarity of universalizing
political, philosophical, and linguistic systems are ones to consider
with utmost seriousness and thoughtfulness.
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